I. S. Menshikov The Proceedings volume, Information Technology and Economic Modelling, of a joint Finnish-Soviet symposium, Helsinki, Finland, 20-22 November, 1990.Techical Resarch Centre of Finland, Espoo , 01.1992 , p. 173-205, language: английский ISSN 951-38-4086-7  Аннотация Any game theoretical equilibrium is not effective as a social choice function. In general, the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. So, it is reasonable to consider an improvement of the original game associated with negotiation. In Section 1 we give a comparison of several known approaches to game theoretical research of negotiation. In section 2 we discuss a problem of axiomatic characterization of a negotiation mechanism. The most attractive applications of this idea correspond to extensive form games (section 3). We consider renegotiation of two different types: talks at the initial position of the game and those at one of the next positions when, after disagreement, somebody makes a move in the original game. A number of unexpected feature of that model are represented.  Ключевые слова game theoretical equilibrium, social choice function, Pareto optimal, negotiation, axiomatic characterization